Suppose that a newborn baby is diagnosed as a hemophiliac. The parents, daunted by the prospect of bringing up a child in this condition, are not anxious for him to live. Could euthanasia be defended here? Our first reaction may well be a firm No, for the infant can be expected to have a life worth living, even if it is not quite as good as a normal baby. The "prior existence" version of utilitarianism supports this judgment. The infant exists. His life can be expected to contain a positive balance between happiness over misery. To kill him would deprive him of this positive balance. Therefore it would be wrong.
On the "total" version of utilitarianism, however, we cannot reach a decision on the basis of this information alone. The total view makes it necessary to ask whether the death of the hemophiliac infant would lead to the creation of another being who would not otherwise have existed. In other words, if the hemophiliac child is killed, will his parents have another child whom they would not have had if the hemophiliac child lives? If they would, is the second child likely to have a better life than the one killed?
Often it will be possible to answer both these questions affirmatively.
When the death of a disabled infant will lead to the birth of another infant with better prospects of a happy life, the total amount of happiness will be greater if the disabled infant is killed. The loss of happy life for the first infant is outweighed by the gain of a happier life for the second.
Therefore, if killing the hemophiliac infant has no adverse effect on the others, it would, according to the total view, be right to kill him. The main point is clear: killing a disabled infant is not morally equivalent to killing a person. Very often it is not wrong at all.
[Ed.: The New York Times notes that Mr. Singer is a top scholar who, before entering the field of medical ethics, already had considerable influence on the animal rights movement. A proponent of Jeremy Bentham's school of utilitarianism, which judges the morality of an action by its consequences rather than by any intrinsic qualities, Singer is concerned with the overall quality of life rather than its supposed sanctity. Arguing that the total amount of suffering in the world must be decreased (which he backs up by donating 20 percent of his income to famine relief agencies), Singer concludes that killing a disabled infant or terminally ill patient can be justified over killing a healthy animal, or at least one that displays comparable levels of emotion and rational behavior. While he believes it is never justified to kill a disabled person who expresses a wish to live, for infants or others who can't make their wills known the decision falls to parents and doctors on a case-by-case basis.
In a later interview with the Princeton alumni weekly, Singer responded to his critics' challenge that were he to follow his own principles, he would redirect the large amount of money spent caring for his mother, who suffers from Alzheimer's disease, to the poor. "Yes. In a sense, my spending money on my mother's care is in conflict with that principle," Singer said. "But so is the fact that I flew back to Australia to visit my daughters at Christmas. That money could also be better spent elsewhere. I've never claimed that I live my life perfectly in accordance with those principles of sharing my money as much as I should."
Singer has also long complained of his exclusion from German academic conferences, where scholars detected a link between his ideas and their recent unhappy experience under Nazi rule.]
